} R3410_ec_params;
extern R3410_ec_params R3410_2001_paramset[],
- *R3410_2012_256_paramset,
- R3410_2012_512_paramset[];
+ *R3410_2012_256_paramset, R3410_2012_512_paramset[];
extern const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN gost_cmds[];
int gost_control_func(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void));
struct gost_mac_pmeth_data {
short int key_set;
- short int mac_size;
+ short int mac_size;
+ int mac_param_nid;
EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char key[32];
};
+
+struct gost_mac_key {
+ int mac_param_nid;
+ unsigned char key[32];
+ short int mac_size;
+};
/* GOST-specific ASN1 structures */
typedef struct {
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(MASKED_GOST_KEY)
/*============== Message digest and cipher related structures ==========*/
- /*
- * Structure used as EVP_MD_CTX-md_data. It allows to avoid storing
- * in the md-data pointers to dynamically allocated memory. I
- * cannot invent better way to avoid memory leaks, because openssl
- * insist on invoking Init on Final-ed digests, and there is no
- * reliable way to find out whether pointer in the passed md_data is
- * valid or not.
- */
+ /*
+ * Structure used as EVP_MD_CTX-md_data. It allows to avoid storing
+ * in the md-data pointers to dynamically allocated memory. I
+ * cannot invent better way to avoid memory leaks, because openssl
+ * insist on invoking Init on Final-ed digests, and there is no
+ * reliable way to find out whether pointer in the passed md_data is
+ * valid or not.
+ */
struct ossl_gost_digest_ctx {
gost_hash_ctx dctx;
gost_ctx cctx;
int key_meshing;
int bytes_left;
int key_set;
- int dgst_size;
+ int dgst_size;
};
/* Table which maps parameter NID to S-blocks */
extern struct gost_cipher_info gost_cipher_list[];